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ABSTRACT
Using US Census data for 1990-2000, we estimate effects of NAFTA on US wages. We look for effects
of the agreement by industry and by geography, measuring each industry’s vulnerability to Mexican
imports, and each locality’s dependance on vulnerable industries. We find evidence of both effects,
dramatically lowering wage growth for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and localities
(even for service-sector workers in affected localities). These distributional effects are much larger
than aggregate welfare effects estimated by other authors. In addition, we find strong evidence of anticipatory
adjustment in places whose protection was expected to fall but had not yet fallen; this adjustment appears
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Perhaps the most passionately debated issue in trade policy within the United States in
a generation has been the signing and implementation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), signed by the governments of the US, Canada and Mexico in 1993.
Opponents believe that it has devastated some parts of the country by encouraging multina-
tionals to shift operations to Mexico, while proponents argue that it has boosted US exports
and thus job growth. Despite the age of the agreement, as recently as 2008 it became the
subject of intense political debate, with Democratic presidential candidates competing with
each other in denunciations of the agreement in Ohio, a state in which many voters blame
the agreement for local economic diﬃculties (Austen, 2008). Brown (2004, Ch. 6) presents
a passionate example of the liberal non-economist’s case against the NAFTA, arguing that
it has destroyed millions of US jobs as well as causing environmental problems.
One aspect of popular opposition to the NAFTA has been the claim that it has had
a disparate impact geographically, that it has devastated particularly vulnerable towns
even as others have prospered. Leonhardt (2008) describes the anti-NAFTA sentiment in
Youngstown, Ohio, which had suﬀered a long economic decline that many residents blamed
partly on NAFTA. In particular, residents had recently seen the shuttering of the Youngstown
Steel Door plant, which had been the leading supplier of steel doors for railway cars in North
America for decades; the capital was purchased by a foreign ﬁrm and shipped to a plant in
Mexico. Brown (2004, pp.156-7) argues that the agreement was a devastating blow to the
towns of Nogales, Arizona and El Paso, Texas. At the same time, the town of Laredo,
Texas enjoyed a dramatic economic boom based on traﬃc to and from Mexico following the
agreement (Duggin, 1999). Kumar (2006) argues that the Texas economy as a whole has
beneﬁtted from exports to the Mexico as a result of the agreement.
Unfortunately, economists to date have not provided an answer to the question of whether
or not NAFTA has indeed had the eﬀects ascribed to it by its opponents. This paper is an
attempt to do so. We ask whether or not we can identify subsets of US workers whose
incomes were seriously diminished by the agreement, and if so, do they follow an identiﬁable
geographic pattern.
Our approach is to do what seems like the simplest possible exercise to look for signs of
the eﬀects that NAFTA opponents claim. We try to identify local labor-market eﬀects of
the tariﬀ reductions brought about by the NAFTA, using publicly available US Census data
2from 1990 and 2000, taken from the IPUMS project at the Minnesota Population Center
(www.ipums.org; see Ruggles et. al. (2010)). This data has enough richness to enable us to
capture the features we need to capture.
Three features in particular that we need to capture should be highlighted.
(i) We need to be able to control for a worker’s industry of employment, in order to allow
for the likelihood that workers in industries that compete with imports from Mexico1 will
be aﬀected diﬀerently than workers in other industries. The census data has a very coarse
division of workers into industries that allows us to do so adequately.
(ii) The issue that has been foremost in much of the political debate is a geographic
one: The claim that workers in some vulnerable locations have been harmed, relative to
workers in other places. Thus, we need detailed geographic data, and a measure of how
vulnerable a given location is likely to be to the eﬀects of the NAFTA. The IPUMS data
divide the country into 543 similar-sized, non-overlapping pieces, called Consistent Public-
Use Microdata Areas, or conspumas, whose boundaries are the same for both 1990 and 2000.
Every worker in the data is identiﬁed as living in one of these conspumas, and so this allows
us to control for geography. In particular, in addition to controlling for what industry in
which a worker is employed, we can control for how many of the other workers within a
worker’s conspuma are employed in industries that will compete directly with imports from
Mexico. This will be interpreted as the ‘local vulnerability’ of the labor market to the eﬀects
of NAFTA.
(iii) The agreement was framed as a gradual phase-in of tariﬀ elimination between the
three countries, starting in 1994 and continuing for 10 years (with a few tariﬀs continuing
to 15 years). The negotiated schedule of liberalization was diﬀerent for each sector of the
economy. As a result, for some industries, the period from 1990 to 2000 would represent the
period of an announcement of tariﬀ reductions, most of which occurred after 2000. For other
industries, the same period would be a period of rapid elimination of tariﬀs. Consider two
hypothetical industries. Industry A beneﬁtted from a 12% tariﬀ in 1990; by 2000, the tariﬀ
on imports of that industry’s products from Mexico had fallen to 9%, with the remaining
9% scheduled to be eliminated between 2000 and 2004. Industry B beneﬁtted from a 3%
tariﬀ as of 1990, which was completely eliminated on imports from Mexico by 2000. Both
of these industries saw a drop in their respective Mexico tariﬀs of 3 percentage points in the
1Note that we are not interested in imports from Canada, since tariﬀs between the US and Canada had
already been eliminated by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.
3sample period 1990-2000, but we would not expect the same economic eﬀects in these two
cases since in the case of Industry A, most of the tariﬀ reduction is anticipated, rather than
being realized over the period of the data. In any model of dynamic adjustment, anticipated
tariﬀ changes can have important eﬀects over and above realized tariﬀ changes. To deal
with this, we measure the extent of anticipated tariﬀ reduction by the initial tariﬀs (since all
intra-NAFTA tariﬀs needed to be eliminated over the course of the agreement), and control
for this in regressions in addition to the actual realized tariﬀ reduction between 1990 and
2000.
To anticipate results, we ﬁnd that NAFTA-vulnerable locations that lost their protection
quickly experienced signiﬁcantly slower wage growth compared to locations that had no
protection against Mexico in the ﬁrst place, particularly for blue-collar workers. For the most
heavily NAFTA-vulnerable locations, a high-school dropout would have up to 8 percentage
points slower wage growth from 1990 to 2000 compared to the same worker in a location with
no initial protection. There is, however, an even larger industry eﬀect, with wage growth in
the most protected industries that lose their protection quickly falling 16 percentage points
relative to industries that were unprotected to begin with.
To put it in concrete terms, the eﬀect of the NAFTA on most workers and on the average
worker is likely close to zero, but for an important minority of workers the eﬀects are very
negative. A high-school dropout living in an apparel and footwear dependent small town in
South Carolina, even if she is employed in the non-traded sector such as in a diner where she
would appear to be immune to trade shocks, would see substantially lower wage growth from
1990 to 2000 than if she were in, for example, College Park, Maryland, as the local workers in
tradable sectors that do compete with Mexico start seeking jobs in the non-traded sectors. At
the same time, if the same worker had actually been employed in those vulnerable tradables
sectors when the agreement was signed, she would be hurt twice, with a much lower wage
growth than fellow workers who were already working in the diner. These eﬀects, however,
are much smaller – and statistically insigniﬁcant – for college-educated workers.
In addition, we ﬁnd evidence of anticipatory eﬀects. Comparing two locations that ex-
perience the same drop in weighted average tariﬀ over the sample period, if one of them
still has high tariﬀs on Mexican imports and thus expects further drops in protection soon,
while the other is now unprotected, the location expecting further tariﬀ drops on average
sees wage increases as less-educated workers leave the area, making less-educated workers
4scarcer, as in Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008).
2 Previous work
Post-NAFTA, much work on the economic eﬀects of the agreement has focussed on trade
creation and trade diversion. Romalis (2007) studies changes in trade ﬂows following NAFTA
and ﬁnds that trade diversion eﬀects of the agreement were substantial, and swamped any
beneﬁts from trade creation, leaving a net aggregate welfare beneﬁt for the US of about zero.
Caliendo and Parro (2009) calibrate and simulate an Eaton-Kortum-type model of North
American trade to estimate the eﬀects of NAFTA. Taking full account of enhanced trade
in intermediate inputs and inter-industry input-output linkages, they ﬁnd small increases
in welfare for each NAFTA country as a result of the agreement. Neither of these papers
addresses within-country income distribution, which is the focus of this paper.
A few papers have looked at aggregate eﬀects on US labor markets, summarized in
Burﬁsher et. al. (2001), and have found only small eﬀects. Hanson (2007) ﬁnds that in
the most globalization-aﬀected regions of Mexico over the introduction of NAFTA both
inequality and poverty fell relative to the rest of the country. Prina (2009a,b) ﬁnds that
Mexican small farmers tended to beneﬁt from the agreement on balance, and that there
does not seem to have been much of an eﬀect on rural landless workers.
An important related study is Treﬂer (2004), who studied ﬁrm- and industry-level data
on Canadian manufacturing to ﬁnd eﬀects of the earlier Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.
That study found substantial employment reductions in Canadian industries whose tariﬀ
against US imports fell the fastest, but no reduction in wages and a substantial improvement
in productivity growth. The study did not look for local labor-market eﬀects.
We here borrow ideas from a number of sources. A number of studies identify eﬀects
of a national trade shock on local labor markets, most notably the pioneering paper by
Topalova (2007), who constructed an employment-weighted average tariﬀ for each Indian
district to identify the diﬀerential eﬀects of local labor-market shocks on diﬀerent locations.
Kovak (2010) uses a similar technique for Brazil. These studies indicate signiﬁcant location-
speciﬁc eﬀects of trade shocks on wages, which of course implies mobility costs of some sort
for workers that prevent them from arbitraging wage diﬀerences across locations. A rich
literature examines the correlation of changes in industry tariﬀs or other industry-speciﬁc
5trade shocks with industry wages. Revenga (1992) ﬁnds eﬀects of an industry’s import price
on that industry’s wages in the US. Pavcnik, Attanasio and Goldberg (2004) ﬁnd such eﬀects
for Columbia. Here, we allow for both local labor market eﬀects and industry eﬀects.
A number of studies have isolated eﬀects of imports from a speciﬁc geographic origin on
domestic labor markets. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) ﬁnd that imports from low-
wage countries have much more pronounced eﬀects on the survival probabilities of US plants
in the same product category than imports from other locations. Ebenstein et. al. (2009)
show that oﬀshoring to low-wage countries is associated with reductions in US employment
in the same industry, while oﬀshoring to high-wage countries has the opposite eﬀect. Autor,
Dorn and Hanson (2011) show that a rise in China’s share of imports reduces wages in US
localities where employment is concentrated in the aﬀected industries. Although Mexico is
not a low-wage country by the deﬁnition used in these papers, we do isolate Mexico-speciﬁc
eﬀects of imports on US workers in a similar manner.
In addition, Kennan and Walker (2011) and Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010)
estimate structural models of labor mobility, the former focussing on geographic mobility
and the latter on inter-industry mobility. Both studies ﬁnd large costs to moving, but not
enough to keep a substantial number of workers from moving when economic shocks call for
it. Our reduced-form regression can be interpreted as providing conﬁrming evidence for such
moving costs.
We also draw ideas from Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008) on the eﬀects of antici-
pated changes in trade policy on current labor-market outcomes, although in this paper we
do not estimate a structural empirical model.
3 Empirical approach
The approach described above requires a measure of protection by industry and also by
geographic location. Note that for each industry j of the 89 Census traded-goods industries,
we have an average tariﬀ, τ
j
t , assessed on goods from industry j entering the US from Mexico.
To turn this into a measure of protection in geographic terms, we compute the initial average
tariﬀ in a given location, c, which we interpret as the ‘vulnerability’ of the location to the
NAFTA. We deﬁne this similarly to the local average tariﬀ in Topalova (2007), but we take
into account that Mexico is not good at producing everything; a high tariﬀ on imports of
6good j from Mexico makes no diﬀerence if Mexico has no comparative advantage in j and will
not export it regardless of the tariﬀ. We thus form an average local tariﬀ, averaged across
industries weighted by local employment in each industry and also by Mexico’s revealed
comparative advantage in each industry.
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is Mexico’s revealed comparative advantage in j, a slight adaptation of Balassa’s (1965)
familiar formulation. Here, xMEX
j,1990 is Mexico’s exports of good j to the rest of the world
excluding the US (ROW) and xROW
j,1990 is total exports of good j from countries excluding the
US and Mexico to each other. Therefore, RCAj is Mexico’s share of ROW trade in good
j, divided by Mexico’s share in total ROW trade. The interpretation is that if RCAj > 1,
Mexico has more of a tendency to export j than the average product, and thus has a revealed
comparative advantage in good j.









4τj is the change in the tariﬀ on good j imports from Mexico from 1990 to 2000.
Now, to show how we attempt to deal with the dynamic issues mentioned as point (iii)
above, for the moment set aside geography and focus on industry-level eﬀects (which would
be an appropriate approach if, for example, we were certain that geographic mobility costs
were zero). Then we could run a regression as follows:













where i indexes workers; Xi is a set of individual characteristics; j(i) is the index of worker
i’s industry; indi,j is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if individual i is employed
7in industry j; yr2000i is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if individual i is observed in the




1990; i is a random disturbance term; and the α’s and θ’s are
parameters to be estimated.2
In this speciﬁcation, there are two factors that allow for wages to grow at diﬀerent rates
between 1990 and 2000 in diﬀerent industries, both captured by the two terms in brace
brackets. The more obvious of these is that the tariﬀ on industry i’s products imported from
Mexico may fall at diﬀerent rates for diﬀerent industries; this is captured by the change in
tariﬀ in the second term in brace brackets. However, we also need to take into account that
for some industries the tariﬀ elimination was virtually complete by 2000, while for others
it was ongoing, and so would generate expectations of future liberalization that would also
aﬀect wages. To capture this, we include the initial tariﬀ separately from the change in
tariﬀ, in the ﬁrst of the two terms in the brace brackets. The year-1990 tariﬀ captures the
scale of the anticipated total tariﬀ reduction (since all tariﬀs on Mexican goods must be
brought down to zero over the adjustment period of the agreement). Holding constant the
realized change in tariﬀ from 1990 to 2000, a higher value of the 1990 tariﬀ indicates a larger
anticipated reduction in tariﬀs following 2000.
Anticipated liberalization of this sort can have a wide range of eﬀects. Artuç, Chaudhuri
and McLaren (2008) show that in a model with costly labor adjustment, an anticipated
liberalization of trade in one industry can lead to a steady stream of exiting workers, creating
a labor shortage and rising wages in that sector. The way this works is illustrated in Figures
1 and 2, which illustrate the time path of employment and wages for a pair of hypothetical
industries. Suppose that they both have the same level of τ
j
1990. In 1994, the agreement
is made public and ratiﬁed, and the industry in Figure 1 loses its tariﬀ right away. This
leads to a sudden drop in wages in industry i, and a ﬂow of workers out of the industry.
As workers leave the industry, the equilibrium moves up and to the left along the industry
labor-demand curve, increasing wages progressively toward the new steady state as shown
in the second panel of Figure 1. The new steady state wage could be above or below the
old one, and so the diﬀerence in wages between the sampled wages at 1990 and 2000 could
be positive, negative or zero. Contrast this situation with the case of the delayed tariﬀ
elimination of Figure 2. Here, suppose that the tariﬀ is scheduled in the agreement to be
2Note that our Census data, which we will describe in detail shortly, take the form of two cross sections
rather than a panel. Each individual i in the sample is observed once; some are observed in 1990 and some
in 2000.
8eliminated in 2004. Between 1994 and 2000, workers will be gradually leaving the industry
in anticipation of this tariﬀ elimination, moving the equilibrium up and to the left along the
industry labor-demand curve, and therefore steadily increasing the wage. In this case, the
sampled industry wage in 2000 will deﬁnitely be higher than the sampled industry wage in
1990. Note that in Figure 2, τi
1990 > 0 and 4τi = 0, and the wage increases over the sample
period. Compare that with another industry j that never had a tariﬀ, and so expects no
losses from NAFTA: τ
j
1990 = 4τj = 0. Over the sample period, clearly industry i’s wages
rise relative to wages in industry j.
Clearly, in a model of that sort, θ1 would be positive: Holding constant the realized tariﬀ
reduction during the sample period, the larger the tariﬀ reduction anticipated during the
sample period, the more workers will stream out of the industry and the more rapidly will
wages in the industry rise during the sample period. A model with heterogeneous workers
or ﬁrms might generate a similar eﬀect, as workers or ﬁrms that are only marginally suited
to the liberalizing industry leave it in anticipation, leaving only the higher-productivity
producers and hence higher average wages. On the other hand, in a model with frictional
job search and costly creation of vacancies as in Hosios (1990), anticipated liberalization
will have the eﬀect of curtailment of vacancies, which could occur more rapidly than worker
exodus, leading to rising unemployment and falling wages in the industry. In this case, we
would see θ1 < 0. We can parsimoniously say that θ1 captures the ‘anticipatory eﬀect’ of the
liberalization, while θ2 captures the ‘impact eﬀect.’ Of course, in the event that an industry
loses its tariﬀ entirely during the sample period so that 4τj = −τ
j
1990, the eﬀect on the wage
during the sample period is then θ1 − θ2.
Equation (2) summarizes the essence of our approach to dynamics, but in practice we
are interested in capturing more detail than it entails. In particular, we wish to allow the
eﬀects on wages to diﬀer by educational class. We break the sample down into four classes:
less than high school; high-school graduate; some college; and college graduate, and allow
both the initial wage and the wage growth to vary by these categories. This yields the richer
regression equation:

































where educij is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if worker i is in educational category k.
The variables of interest here, corresponding to the anticipatory eﬀect and the impact eﬀect
discussed in the context of equation (2), are θ2k and θ4k.3
Equation (3) allows for a rich characterization of dynamic response that varies by industry
and education, but it does not yet allow for geography. To incorporate that, we include terms
that treat local average tariﬀs as in (1), in a way that is parallel to the treatment of industry
tariﬀs. In addition, to be consistent, in controlling for the level of protection by industry,
we use the product of industry tariﬀ with the revealed comparative advantage, RCAjτ
j
1990.
We also allow for a diﬀerent rate of wage growth for locations on the US-Mexico border,
producing our main regression equation:






























































+ µBorderc(i)yr2000i + i,
3The term with θ3k is included only for consistency; it does not seem to have much economic meaning,
and does not make much diﬀerence whether or not it is included in the regression.
10where conspumai,c is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if worker i resides in conspuma
c, c(i) is the index of worker i’s conspuma, and loc4τc(i) is the change in tariﬀ for location
c, as deﬁned at the beginning of this section.
The parameters of primary interest here are δ2,k and δ4,k, which measure the anticipatory
eﬀect and the impact eﬀect, respectively, for the local average tariﬀ change; and θ2,k and θ4,k,
which measure the anticipatory eﬀect and the impact eﬀect, respectively, for the industry
tariﬀ. If there is no dynamic adjustment, so that the labor market simply responds to current
tariﬀs regardless of expectations, then we will observe δ2,k = θ2,k = 0.
If it is easy for workers to move geographically, so that local wage premiums are arbitraged
away, but diﬃcult for workers to switch industry, we will observe δ1,k,...,δ4,k = 0 while
θ1,k,...,θ4,k 6= 0. In that case, industry matters, but location does not. This, together with
the assumption that δ2,k = 0 is how the model in a number of studies such as Pavcnik,
Attanasio and Goldberg (2004) are set up. On the other hand, if it is diﬃcult for workers
to move geographically but easy to switch industries within one location, we will see the
opposite: δ1,k,...,δ4,k 6= 0 while θ1,k,...,θ4,k = 0. A ‘pure Youngstown’ eﬀect would be
indicated by δ4,k > 0 while δ2,k = θ2,k = θ4,k = 0. This would imply that an export-sector
worker in Youngstown (with its industries that compete with Mexican imports) would suﬀer
a wage reduction due to NAFTA, while an import-competing worker in Arlington, VA (with
only very few workers employed in industries that compete with Mexican imports) would
not. This is how the model in Kovak (2010) is set up.
Finally, for a location that loses all of its protection within the sample period, the eﬀect
on wages within the sample period is equal to δ2,k − δ4,k, while for an industry that loses all
of its protection within the sample period, the eﬀect on wages within the sample period is
equal to θ2,k − θ4,k.
4 Data
We use a 5% sample from the US Census for 1990 and 2000, collected from usa.ipums.org,
selecting workers from age 25 to 64 who report a positive income in the year before the
census.4 We include the personal characteristics age, gender, marital status, whether or
not the worker speaks English, race, and educational attainment (less than high school,
4The sample includes individuals who report being employed, unemployed or not in labor force in the
census year. We use the last industry of employment for the unemployed and those not in labor force.
11high school graduate, some college, college graduate). In addition, we have the industry of
employment and conspuma of residence for each worker as well as the worker’s pre-tax wage
and salary income. Our sample size is 10,320,274 workers.
We use data on US tariﬀs on imports from Mexico collected by John Romalis and de-
scribed in Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). We constructed a concordance to map
the 8-digit tariﬀ data into the 89 traded-goods industry categories of the Census in order
to construct industry tariﬀs τ
j
t .5 We used Mexican trade data from the US International
Trade Commission to obtain a trade-weighted average tariﬀ for each Census industry.6 To
construct Mexico’s revealed comparative advantage, RCAj, we used data on exports by
reporting countries from the UN Comtrade.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main control variables. The sample is 53%
male and 80% white, with an average age of 41 years. High-school dropouts are 11% of
the total, with the remainder about evenly split between high-school graduates, those with
some college, and college graduates. The tariﬀ in 1990 on Mexican goods ranged across
traded-goods industries from 0 to 17%, with a mean of 2%. These tariﬀs are generally below
the US Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariﬀs which are charged on imports from World Trade
Organization (WTO) members as a default (see Figure 3). The diﬀerence is due to the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), under which rich countries extend discretionary
tariﬀ preferences to lower-income countries (see Hakobyan (2010)). After multiplying the
tariﬀ by RCAj to correct for Mexico’s pattern of comparative advantage, we obtain a product
that ranges from 0 to 8.8% (for footwear). The initial average local tariﬀ ranges across
conspumas from approximately 0.09 to 4.74%, with a mean just above one percent.
We actually have computed two versions of the local average tariﬀ. In one, all industries
are treated in the same way; in the second, we omit agriculture by setting its tariﬀ equal
to zero. The reason for doing this is that aggregation of industries is a particularly large
problem for agriculture, as the Census makes no distinction between diﬀerent crops. We know
that corn, in particular, beneﬁtted greatly from NAFTA due to elimination of Mexican corn
quotas, while other crops, such as some vegetables, were likely hurt. However, with Census
aggregation we are forced to apply the same tariﬀ to all agriculture. This resulted in various
5Note that only 89 out of the 238 Census industry categories produce tradable goods and can be mapped
to trade data. The tariﬀs for the remaining non-traded-goods industries are treated as zeros.
6Trade data are obtained from the US International Trade Commission Trade and Tariﬀ DataWeb at
http://dataweb.usitc.gov.
12farming areas of the great plains, where corn is king, appearing, implausibly, in the top ten
most vulnerable conspumas (see Figure 6). To eliminate this problem, throughout, we have
performed parallel regressions with agriculture omitted by artiﬁcially setting the agriculture
tariﬀ equal to zero, and reported the two sets of regressions side by side. The results are close
to identical, but we refer to the version without agriculture as our preferred speciﬁcation.
Table 2 shows which industries received the most protection against Mexican imports,
and Table 3 shows those with the highest value of the product of tariﬀ and RCAj and
thus potentially the most vulnerable to NAFTA. The top two are footwear and oil and
gas extraction, followed by carpets and rugs and plastics, all in the range of 7 to 8.8%.
Comparison of Tables 2 and 3 shows that the correction for Mexican comparative advantage
makes a fair amount of diﬀerence.7 Figure 4 shows that the relationship between the 1990
tariﬀ levels and the decline in tariﬀs between 1990 and 2000 mostly follows a linear pattern,
but with plenty of deviations. Industries whose tariﬀs fell more slowly than average include
Footwear (initial tariﬀ is 17%; the 2000 tariﬀ is 11.2%) and Structural clay products (initial
tariﬀ is 14.5%; the 2000 tariﬀ is 6.8%). After adjusting for Mexico’s revealed comparative
advantage, tariﬀs in these industries still fell the slowest (see Figure 5). Four industries
(Dairy products; Cycles and miscellaneous transportation equipment; Printing, publishing,
and allied industries; Agricultural chemicals) experienced tariﬀ increases between 1990 and
2000.
Table 4 shows the conspumas with the highest and lowest 1990 local average tariﬀs on
Mexican goods, and hence the most and least potential vulnerability to NAFTA (the local
average tariﬀs with agriculture omitted is used). The list is dominated by manufacturing
areas of the Carolinas and southern Virginia. The least vulnerable locations include Wash-
ington, D.C. and its suburbs in northern Virginia and Maryland. Figure 5 shows a mostly
linear relationship between the 1990 local tariﬀ levels and the decline in local tariﬀs, but
with plenty of variation. The largest diﬀerences between the initial local tariﬀ and change
in local tariﬀ are observed in a conspuma in the state of Indiana (initial tariﬀ is 3.32%; the
change in tariﬀ is −2.26%). As will be seen, the variance of the diﬀerences between initial
local tariﬀs and local tariﬀ changes is suﬃcient to identify diﬀerential eﬀects quite well.
7An earlier draft did not correct for Mexican comparative advantage at all. The results were qualitatively
similar, but for the location variables the impact and anticipatory eﬀects were larger, and the net eﬀect was
much smaller. Those details are available on request.
135 Results
Table 5 shows the results for the main regression with all right-hand-side variables and
industry and conspuma ﬁxed eﬀects. This is the estimation of equation (4), with clustering
of standard errors by conspuma, industry, and year, following Cameron, Gelbach and Miller
(2006). The worker controls have unsurprising coeﬃcients. Married white men enjoy a wage
premium; there is a concave age curve; and workers with more education earn higher wages,
ceteris paribus. For each educational class k, the coeﬃcients of interest are the equivalent of
the key parameters in (4): δ2,k, which are listed in the table as the ‘Anticipation Eﬀect’ for
the Location-Speciﬁc Controls; δ4,k, listed as the ‘Impact Eﬀect’ for the Location-Speciﬁc
Controls; θ2,k, listed as the ‘Anticipation Eﬀect’ for the Industry-Speciﬁc Controls; and θ4,k,
listed as the ‘Impact Eﬀect’ for the Industry-Speciﬁc Controls. In addition, the values of
δ2,k − δ4,k and θ2,k − θ4,k for the case with agriculture excluded are reported in Table 6,
together with the results of the test of the hypothesis that these diﬀerences are equal to
0. Throughout, we present results with and without agriculture excluded for comparison;
the results are very similar, and we will focus on our preferred speciﬁcation with agriculture
excluded.
Looking ﬁrst at the local variables, we ﬁnd point estimates of 10.28 for δ2,lhs and 12.12
for δ4,lhs. Note ﬁrst that the impact eﬀect is larger than the anticipatory eﬀect, and Table 6
shows that δ2,lhs−δ4,lhs takes a value of -1.84, with a high level of signiﬁcance. In other words,
among conspumas that lost their protection quickly under NAFTA, those that appeared to
be very vulnerable had substantially lower wage growth for high-school dropouts than those
with low initial tariﬀs. Recalling that the most vulnerable conspumas had an initial local
average tariﬀ in the neighborhood of 4 or 5, this implies a drop in wage growth of around 8
percentage points in such a conspuma, a very substantial diﬀerence. Second, note that each
of these terms individually is also very diﬀerent from zero. The positive sign on the coeﬃcient
for the tariﬀ change (12.12) indicates that for a given initial level of protection, locations
that lost protection more quickly had more sluggish wage growth over the sample period
– the impact eﬀect. The positive sign on the coeﬃcient for the initial level of protection
locτc
1990 indicates that for a given realized tariﬀ change during the sample period, the higher
is the initial tariﬀ (and thus the larger is the anticipated total tariﬀ reduction), the higher is
the wage growth over the sample period – the anticipation eﬀect, just as described in Figure
2. The magnitudes are large. For a conspuma with a 4% initial local average tariﬀ, this
14anticipatory eﬀect amounts to an increase in wage growth for high-school dropouts relative
to the rest of the economy equal to 40 percentage points.
Similar comments apply for high-school graduates and for workers with some college but
with smaller magnitudes, while college graduates show much smaller coeﬃcients, as well as
anticipatory and impact eﬀects of opposite sign.
Brieﬂy, the eﬀect of the dummy for location on the Mexican border is both statistically
insigniﬁcant and economically minuscule, implying half a percentage point of additional wage
growth over a ten-year period. Evidently, the experience of towns like Laredo and towns like
Nogales cancel each other out on average.
Turning now to the coeﬃcients on the industry eﬀects, the ﬁrst feature to point out is
that, from Table 5, the industry eﬀects θ2,k,θ4,k are not nearly as precisely estimated as
the corresponding δ2,k,δ4,k coeﬃcients for the location eﬀects were. However, from Table 6,
the diﬀerences θ2,k − θ4,k are precisely estimated (apart from college graduates, for whom
the diﬀerence is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero). Recall that the most highly-protected
industries had an initial value of tariﬀ times RCA in the neighborhood of 8%; high-school
dropouts in such an industry, if it lost its protection right away, would see wage growth
16 percentage points lower than similar workers in an industry that had had no protection.
Again, the eﬀect is much smaller for those with some college, and negligible (as well as
statistically insigniﬁcant) for college graduates.
The fact that the industry eﬀects hit blue-collar workers, especially high-school dropouts,
but not college graduates suggests the possibility that the costs of switching industries are
larger for less-educated workers, so that more-educated workers can arbitrage industry wage
diﬀerences away.8 This contrasts with the local labor-market eﬀects, which suggest that
blue-collar workers are quite mobile geographically.
To sum up, both locational variables and industry variables are highly statistically sig-
niﬁcant after controlling for a wide range of personal characteristics. This suggests that
both costs of moving geographically and costs of switching industries are important. In ad-
dition, we ﬁnd, for blue collar workers, a signiﬁcant ‘Youngstown’ eﬀect in the data: More
vulnerable locations that lost their tariﬀs quickly had smaller wage growth compared with
locations that had no NAFTA vulnerability at all, controlling for a broad range of personal
8It should be noted that Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) looked for diﬀerences in inter-industry
mobility costs and found no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. However, they used only two skill categories (some college
and no college), had a much smaller data set, and were not controlling for geographical mobility.
15characteristics. In addition, both by locality and by industry, anticipatory eﬀects are in evi-
dence, but the eﬀect is more robust for the results by locality. Locations that were expected
to lose protection but had not lost it yet saw wages rise relative to the rest of the country,
possibly because of workers leaving the area and making labor more scarce. This applies
across industries, so that even workers in a non-traded industry – waiting on tables in a
diner, for example – beneﬁtted from the (temporary) rise in wages.
6 Migration
The fact that wages rose more quickly in locations that anticipated a future drop in tariﬀs
suggests the possibility that workers tend to leave such locations or to avoid moving to
them, in anticipation of the future liberalization, thus driving up local wages temporarily
much as in Artuç, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2008). We explore that possibility in Table 7.
In the regression reported there, the dependent variable is the change in the log of the total
number of workers of educational class k employed full time in conspuma c between 1990
and 2000. We regress this on locτc
1990 and loc4τc to see if movements in workers are driven
to a signiﬁcant degree by the anticipated or realized tariﬀ changes.
It should be pointed out that this exercise is illustrative; the employment growth ﬁgures
are very volatile. This is likely due to the IPUMS sampling method; we draw a 5% sample
from the Census, but there is no guarantee that 5% of the individuals from each conspuma
are in the sample. Random variation in the location of sampled individuals creates large
variations in the apparent size of conspumas over time. For example, the change between
1990 and 2000 in the log of employed high-school dropouts within a conspuma ranges from
−0.661 to 0.5728. It is hard to believe that the number of such workers rose or fell by two
thirds in any location over 10 years.
Nonetheless, for our purposes this is nothing more than noise in the left-hand side vari-
able, and although it makes it more diﬃcult to measure a statistically signiﬁcant relationship,
it does not necessarily generate any bias in the regression. The regression does provide some
information on the overall pattern of worker movements. The only signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
are for high-school dropouts, and the main message is that a conspuma with a high level of
protection tended to lose high-school dropouts over the 1990’s relative to other conspumas
whether the conspuma lost its protection right away (since −43.20 + 38.49 < 0) or merely
16anticipated losing it (since −43.20 < 0). This can be also seen in Figure 8, which plots
the change in employment shares for each education class against initial local tariﬀ. The
ﬁgure shows that highly vulnerable conspumas tended to shed high-school dropouts over the
1990’s.
We interpret this as weak evidence in favor of the migration story, since anticipation of a
drop in the local tariﬀ leads to a drop in the number of local blue-collar workers. However,
a diﬀerent dataset will be needed to explore this question in a more credible way.
7 Alternative approaches
We have explored some alternative ways of approaching the regression in order to check for
robustness of the main results.
7.1 Import shares in place of tariﬀs
A natural concern is that NAFTA changed not only tariﬀ but non-tariﬀ barriers, border
procedures, and dispute-resolution mechanisms, all of which can have a large eﬀect on trade.
As a result, our tariﬀ measure is an imperfect measure of the policy changes brought about by
NAFTA. In addition, there is the possibility that the tariﬀ changes we track are correlated
with other aspects of globalization, and so the eﬀects that they are picking up are not
speciﬁc to trade with Mexico. For instance, US MFN tariﬀs also saw decline over this period
according to staged duty reductions under the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.9
To address these issues, we have tried an alternative approach similar in spirit to Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006)’s use of import penetration by low-wage countries (with parallels
in Ebenstein et. al. (2009) and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2011)). Speciﬁcally, we perform
a simple regression using changes in Mexican import shares as a proxy for the whole range
of policy changes embodied in NAFTA that aﬀect trade ﬂows. For industry j, at date t, we
compute Mexico’s share, M
j
t , in US imports of industry-j goods. For each conspuma c, we
ﬁnd the local average value of M
j
t , with weights given by employment shares in 1990 within
the conspuma, and denote that local average as Mc
t. Analogous to the Mexican tariﬀ, we
calculate this measure with and without agriculture by setting the change in Mexican import
9The Uruguay Round Agreements Act was signed into law on December 8, 1994, as Public Law No.
103-465.
17share to zero for agricultural products. Figure 9 shows considerable variation in the industry
Mexican import shares between 1990 and 2000, with Leather tanning and ﬁnishing and
Railroad locomotives and equipment experiencing the largest increase (35 and 31 percentage
points, respectively). The largest drop in Mexican import share is observed for industries
Nonmetallic mining and quarrying, except fuels and Agricultural production, livestock, 11.5
and 10.3 percentage points, respectively. From Table 1, the average change in Mexican
import share across 89 traded-goods industries is 2.9 percentage points, and the average
change in local Mexican import share across all conspumas is 0.7 percentage points.
We run a wage regression with the following right-hand side variables: the individual
controls, industry and conspuma ﬁxed eﬀects as in the main regression; plus the change,
4Mj, in the industry Mexican import share interacted with education class and year-2000
dummies; and the change, 4Mc, in the local-average Mexican import share interacted with
education class and year-2000 dummies. In eﬀect, in a simpliﬁed form, the Mexican import
shares take over the role of the Mexican tariﬀs in the main regression. Descriptive statistics
are included in Table 1, and the main results are shown in Table 8 (we suppress all coeﬃcient
estimates except for the interactions with the change in import share and year-2000 dummy,
since those are the coeﬃcients of interest).
In this regression the location eﬀects essentially disappear. The location coeﬃcients are
mostly statistically insigniﬁcant, and the point estimates multiplied by even the largest
change in location-average import share are economically negligible (−0.46 × 3.44% =
−1.58% for high-school dropouts, for example, meaning less than 2 percentage points of
reduced wage growth over 10 years for the most heavily-aﬀected worker). The industry re-
sults, however, come out more strongly than in the tariﬀ regression. For each education class
except for college graduates, a rise in the Mexican share of imports of the workers’ industry
results in a statistically signiﬁcant drop in wages relative to workers in other industries. The
eﬀects are of signiﬁcant magnitude as well. For an industry whose Mexico share went from
10% to 20% (an increase of 10 percentage points, about one standard deviation above the
mean increase; see Table 1), they imply a drop in the cumulative growth of high-school
dropout wages of 11 percentage points over the decade. For the maximum rise in an in-
dustry’s Mexican import share, 35 percentage points, the implied drop in cumulative wage
growth for a high-school dropout is 35.5 percentage points – an enormous deﬁcit for a worker
whose wages are already low.
187.2 Controlling for trade with China
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2011) show that increases in imports from China are correlated
with reductions in employment and wages in the local US labor markets that are dependent
on the industries whose imports are increasing. The eﬀects of trade with China are sub-
stantial. A reader might be concerned that these increases in trade with China might be
correlated with increases in trade or reductions in tariﬀs with Mexico. We therefore re-run
the regression to control for Chinese imports. We add two variables to our basic regression:
the share of imports for each industry that comes from China, and the employment-weighted
local average of this share for each conspuma. We interact the ﬁrst diﬀerence of both of these
variables with the education class and year-2000 dummies. The results for the main coeﬃ-
cients of interest are listed in Tables 9 and 10. These correspond to Tables 5 and 6; again,
only coeﬃcients of interest are included. (The coeﬃcients on Chinese import shares gener-
ally show that a higher rate of increase in that import share is correlated with lower wage
growth. Full results are available from the authors on request.)
It is clear from Tables 9 and 10 that the results are barely aﬀected by including trade with
China. Trade with China and the NAFTA appear to have had quite separate, distinguishable
eﬀects.
7.3 Limiting the sample to service-sector workers
In interpreting the main regression results, we have interpreted the coeﬃcients on the location
variables as telling us about what happens to a worker who is not in the tradable sector but
employed in close proximity to workers who are. In Table 11, we scrutinize that interpretation
by limiting our sample only to workers in the service sector and running the main regression
again. Of course, the industry-speciﬁc variables cannot be used in this exercise (apart from
industry ﬁxed eﬀects), since those are all derived from tariﬀs, which do not apply to services.
Again, standard errors are clustered by industry, conspuma and year.
Comparing the last four lines of Table 11 with Table 6 shows almost identical coeﬃcients.
The table therefore conﬁrms that local labor market eﬀects do indeed apply to workers who
are not employed in the tradable sector. Thus, a worker waiting on tables in a town heavily
dependent on NAFTA-vulnerable jobs, although he or she is not employed in an industry
producing tradable output, is nonetheless harmed indirectly by NAFTA, plausibly due to
workers who are in a contracting tradables industry and seek employment in local non-traded
19industries, pushing those wages down.
7.4 Employment eﬀects
To this point, we have focussed on the wage eﬀects of NAFTA. Here we explore eﬀects on
employment status. Table 12 reports the results from a linear probability model (Columns 1
and 2) and a logistic regression (Columns 3 and 4) for the determinants of the probability that
a worker is unemployed (Columns 1 and 3) or not in the labor force (NILF; Columns 2 and 4).
The right-hand-side variables are the same as in the main regression, and are arranged in the
same way as in Table 5, so the ﬁrst four rows can be interpreted as the ‘anticipatory’ eﬀect,
with the following four rows the ‘impact’ eﬀect, and so on. Unfortunately, our data do not
have as clear a story to tell on these employment issues as on wages. Ideally, we would have
panel data for these questions, to see how each worker’s employment status changes from
1990 to 2000, conditional on the worker’s industry and location in 1990, but for a worker in
2000, we can condition only on year-2000 industry and location. Since it is likely that many
workers have switched industry or moved in the intervening years, a decision inﬂuenced by
trade policy as conﬁrmed in Table 7, we are likely to be missing much of the story.
The NILF results are the most informative. Focussing on the estimated coeﬃcients
from the logistic model, the NILF coeﬃcients in the top panel are all negative, with the
coeﬃcient for the ‘anticipatory’ eﬀect for each educational category smaller in magnitude
than the corresponding coeﬃcient for the ‘impact’ eﬀect (this is not true, however, for high-
school dropout results in the linear probability model). The ﬁndings are the same for the
other educational classes, and the pattern is broadly similar for unemployment (except for
college graduates), but generally not statistically signiﬁcant.
However, these estimates imply a truly negligible marginal eﬀect of the tariﬀ on the
probability of being in the labor force, and a very small eﬀect on unemployment. To illustrate
this, we set the values of all right-hand side variables equal to their sample averages, and
focus on the case of high-school dropouts for concreteness. Deﬁne a ‘high’ local tariﬀ as the
average local tariﬀ (1.03% from Table 1) plus one standard deviation (0.67%, from Table 1).
Call a conspuma ‘high-impact’ (‘average impact’) if it had a high (an average) initial tariﬀ
and lost all of its tariﬀ by 2000. We can then use the estimated parameters to compute the
probability of being NILF or unemployed at each date. The outcome of this calculation is
that the change between 1990 and 2000 in the probability of being out of the labor force is
20only 0.07 percentage points higher in a high-impact conspuma than in an average conspuma
(for the linear probability model, the corresponding ﬁgure is 0.08 of a percentage point in the
other direction). The change between 1990 and 2000 in the probability of being unemployed
is only 0.32 percentage points higher in a high-impact conspuma than in an average conspuma
(for the linear probability model, the ﬁgure is 0.34 of a percentage point). These ﬁgures are
small enough to treat as zero for practical purposes.
The industry eﬀects are listed in the bottom half of the table. The overall story for the
not-in-labor-force column is similar (while not precisely estimated) in that the impact eﬀect
dominates the anticipatory eﬀect in each case, implying that workers in highly-protected
industries that lost protection were more likely to leave the labor force. Deﬁning the ‘high’
industry tariﬀ to be the average industry tariﬀ plus one standard deviation (as always,
multiplying with the revealed comparative advantage term), we can compute the marginal
eﬀects of the tariﬀs. Call an industry ‘high-impact’ (‘average impact’) if it had a high
(average) initial tariﬀ and lost it all by 2000. The change between 1990 and 2000 in the
probability of a high-school dropout being out of the labor force is 2.1 percentage points
higher in a high-impact industry than in an average industry (for the linear probability
model, the corresponding ﬁgure is 0.72 of a percentage point). By contrast, for all but
high-school dropouts, the eﬀect works in the opposite direction for unemployment, but the
magnitudes are very small. For example, for the linear probability model, the change between
1990 and 2000 in the probability of being unemployed for a high-school graduate is 0.30 of
a percentage point less for a high-tariﬀ industry than for an average-tariﬀ one (conditional
on the worker still being in the same conspuma and not having switched industries).
Overall, no strong message regarding employment eﬀects emerges from these data, which
is not surprising due to our inability to follow workers over time. The exception is modest
evidence that high-impact industries saw a substantial rise in the likelihood that workers
would leave the labor market.
7.5 Some additional qualiﬁcations
A few issues that are beyond our control should be mentioned. First, our measures of location
and industry are both coarse, because of the nature of Census data. We would ideally
prefer to have information on the county of residence for each worker, since a conspuma
21typically encompasses multiple counties.10 By the same token, we have only 89 traded-goods
industries, and so cannot make use of the rich variation in tariﬀ changes across tariﬀ codes.
Because of these issues, we are likely to underestimate the eﬀects of trade on wages in both
geographic and industry dimensions.
Second, it should be remembered that a change in wages brought about by trade policy
will tend to overestimate the welfare change for the workers in question, because the wel-
fare change depends on lifetime utility, which includes option value (Artuç, Chaudhuri and
McLaren (2010)). To assess those welfare changes, we would need a structural model, which
is beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusions
We have tried to identify the distributional eﬀect of NAFTA using US Census data. Our
focus is on the eﬀects of reductions in US tariﬀs on Mexican products under NAFTA on the
wages of US workers.
Limitations on mobility of workers both geographically and across industries appear to be
very important, because we ﬁnd statistically and economically signiﬁcant eﬀects of both local
employment-weighted average tariﬀs and industry tariﬀs on wages. We ﬁnd that reductions
in the local average tariﬀ are associated with substantial reductions in the locality’s blue-
collar wages, even for workers in the service sector, while a reduction in the tariﬀ of the
industry of employment generates additional substantial wage losses. In other words, found
both a ‘Youngstown’ eﬀect and ‘textile’ eﬀect or a ‘footwear’ eﬀect. The blue-collar diner
worker in the footwear town is hurt by the agreement, as is the blue-collar footwear-factory
worker in a town dominated with insurance companies. Worst hit of all is the blue-collar
footwear worker in a footwear town, particularly if that worker never ﬁnished high school.
College-educated workers skate away mainly unharmed.
In addition, we ﬁnd strong evidence of anticipatory eﬀects, at least for local average tariﬀs.
When a location is about to receive a major tariﬀ drop that has not occurred yet, wages
there rise relative to locations with no current protection, possibly because of anticipatory
movements of labor.
Perhaps the main ﬁnding is that the distributional eﬀects of the NAFTA are large.
10The Census does record county information, but the Publicly Available Microsamples do not consistently
report it because of rules to protect conﬁdentiality.
22Whether we deﬁne highly aﬀected industries as industries that had been protected by a
high tariﬀ against Mexican imports, or as industries whose Mexican share of imports rose
quickly, the result is the same: Blue-collar workers in highly-aﬀected industries saw very
substantially lower wage growth than workers in other industries. Since studies of aggregate
welfare eﬀects of the NAFTA such as Romalis (2007) and Caliendo and Parro (2009) ﬁnd at
most very small aggregate US welfare gains from NAFTA (the most optimistic estimate is
0.2% in Caliendo and Parro (2009)), these distributional eﬀects suggest strongly that blue-
collar workers in vulnerable industries suﬀered large absolute declines in real wages as a
result of the agreement. This case study provides another example of the observation made
by Rodrik (1994) that trade policy tends to be characterized by large redistributional eﬀects
and modest aggregate welfare eﬀects, and hence emphasizes once again the importance of
identifying the eﬀects of trade on income distribution (see Harrison, McLaren and McMillan
(2010) for a recent survey).
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35Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Individual-level
Age 41 10 25 64
Male 0.53 0.50 0 1
Married 0.66 0.47 0 1
English speaking 0.99 0.09 0 1
White 0.80 0.40 0 1
High school dropouts 0.11 0.31 0 1
High school graduates 0.31 0.46 0 1
Some college 0.30 0.46 0 1
College graduates 0.28 0.45 0 1




1990 (%) 2.1 3.9 0 17
4τj (%) -1.8 3.4 -16.5 0.9
RCA1990 0.8 2.5 0 22.1
RCAτ
j
1990 (%) 1.0 2.0 0 8.8
RCA4τj (%) -0.9 1.7 -7.0 0.04
4Mj (%) 2.9 6.5 -11.5 34.9
Conspuma-level (excludes agriculture)
locτc
1990(%) 1.03 0.67 0.09 4.74
loc4τc (%) -0.92 0.61 -4.30 -0.08
4Mc(%) 0.75 0.56 -0.40 3.44
36Table 2: Top 20 Most Protected Industries in 1990
Rank Industry Name τ
j
1990 (%) 4τj
1 Footwear, except rubber and plastic 17.0 -11.2
2 Apparel and accessories, except knit 16.6 -16.5
3 Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables 15.9 -15.1
4 Knitting mills 15.7 -15.7
5 Structural clay products 14.5 -6.8
6 Yarn, thread, and fabric mills 9.3 -9.3
7 Leather products, except footwear 7.4 -4.6
8 Dyeing and ﬁnishing textiles, except wool and knit goods 7.4 -7.4
9 Carpets and rugs 6.9 -5.2
10 Grain mill products 5.5 -5.5
11 Agricultural production, crops 5.5 -5.3
12 Pottery and related products 5.1 -5.0
13 Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and ﬁnishing mills 4.2 -2.8
14 Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, n.e.c. 3.9 -3.9
15 Plastics, synthetics, and resins 3.6 -3.6
16 Miscellaneous textile mill products 3.6 -3.6
17 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 3.3 -3.3
18 Paints, varnishes, and related products 3.1 -3.1
19 Engines and turbines 2.3 -2.3
20 Cycles and miscellaneous transportation equipment 2.3 0.2
37Table 3: Top 20 Most Protected Industries in 1990 (adjusted for RCA)
Rank Industry Name RCAτ
j
1990 (%) RCA4τj
1 Footwear, except rubber and plastic 8.8 -5.8
2 Oil and gas extraction 8.3 -6.6
3 Carpets and rugs 7.7 -5.9
4 Plastics, synthetics, and resins 7.0 -7.0
5 Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables 6.6 -6.3
6 Dyeing and ﬁnishing textiles, except wool and knit goods 6.5 -6.5
7 Structural clay products 3.9 -1.8
8 Agricultural production, crops 3.9 -3.8
9 Leather products, except footwear 3.3 -2.0
10 Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and ﬁnishing mills 3.2 -2.1
11 Knitting mills 2.8 -2.8
12 Yarn, thread, and fabric mills 2.7 -2.7
13 Nonmetallic mining and quarrying, except fuels 2.3 -2.3
14 Engines and turbines 2.3 -2.3
15 Glass and glass products 2.0 -1.2
16 Beverage industries 1.9 -1.6
17 Apparel and accessories, except knit 1.7 -1.7
18 Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals 1.4 -1.0
19 Pottery and related products 1.4 -1.3
20 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 1.3 -1.3
38Table 4: Most and Least Vulnerable Conspumas (excludes agriculture)
Rank State Counties/Cities locτc
1990 (%) loc4τc
Panel A: Top 20 Most Vulnerable Conspumas
1 Georgia Catoosa, Dade, Walker 4.74 -4.04
2 North Carolina Alamance, Randolph 4.41 -4.30
3 South Carolina Oconee, Pickens 4.24 -4.12
4 South Carolina including Cherokee, Chester, Chesterﬁeld, Clarendon 3.67 -3.52
5 South Carolina Anderson 3.62 -3.45
6 North Carolina Cabarrus, Rowan 3.54 -3.45
7 North Carolina Alexander, Burke, Caldwell 3.51 -3.30
8 South Carolina including Abbeville, Edgeﬁeld, Fairﬁeld 3.47 -3.33
9 North Carolina Cleveland, McDowell, Polk, Rutherford 3.46 -3.32
10 Indiana Gary 3.32 -2.26
11 Virginia Danville, Pittsylvania 3.27 -3.14
12 North Carolina Catawba 3.23 -3.15
13 South Carolina Spartanburg 3.19 -3.07
14 Missouri including Douglas, Howell, Oregon, Ozark, Shannon 2.98 -2.17
15 Indiana Hammond, Whiting, East Chicago 2.79 -1.93
16 Georgia including Appling, Baldwin, Banks, Barrow, Bartow 2.78 -2.39
17 Michigan Flint 2.71 -2.67
18 North Carolina including Alleghany, Ashe, Avery, Mitchell 2.64 -2.51
19 South Carolina including Greenville, Greer, Mauldin, Simpsonville 2.60 -2.45
20 Pennsylvania Schuylkill 2.57 -2.35
Panel B: Top 20 Least Vulnerable Conspumas
1 D.C. Washington 0.09 -0.08
2 Washington Kitsap 0.19 -0.17
3 Virginia Arlington 0.21 -0.18
4 Maryland Calvert, Charles, St. Mary’s County 0.23 -0.19
5 Montana including Flathead, Lincoln, Missoula, Ravalli 0.27 -0.24
6 Maryland including College Park, Hyattsville, Prince George’s 0.28 -0.25
7 Virginia Alexandria 0.29 -0.26
8 Montana including Big Horn, Blaine, Carter, Chouteau 0.30 -0.24
9 South Dakota including Aurora, Beadle, Bennett, Brule, Buﬀalo 0.30 -0.28
10 Iowa Calhoun, Hamilton, Humboldt, Pocahontas, Webster 0.30 -0.28
11 Washington Whatcom 0.32 -0.28
12 Montana Yellowstone 0.32 -0.26
13 Oregon Clatsop, Columbia, Lincoln, Tillamook 0.32 -0.28
14 California Humboldt 0.33 -0.28
15 Kansas including Clark, Finney, Ford, Grant, Gray, Wichita 0.33 -0.26
16 Kansas including Cheyenne, Decatur, Graham, Russell 0.33 -0.26
17 Virginia Fairfax County, Fairfax city, Falls Church city 0.33 -0.31
18 Oregon Jackson 0.33 -0.29
19 South Dakota including Brookings, Clark, Codington, Hamlin 0.33 -0.31
20 North Dakota including Adams, Barnes, Benson, Billings, Burke 0.34 -0.28
39Table 5: Regression Results
Individual Characteristics














English speaking 0.30*** 0.30***
(0.021) (0.022)
Less than high school -0.78*** -0.78***
(0.031) (0.039)
High school -0.51*** -0.51***
(0.032) (0.039)
Some college -0.35*** -0.36***
(0.030) (0.036)
Less than high school * (Year = 2000) 0.36*** 0.38***
(0.016) (0.017)
High school * (Year = 2000) 0.36*** 0.37***
(0.008) (0.008)
Some college * (Year = 2000) 0.38*** 0.39***
(0.012) (0.012)
College graduate * (Year = 2000) 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.016) (0.019)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by conspuma, industry and year.



































Less than high school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 8.49*** 10.28***
(1.598) (1.594)
High school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 4.07*** 5.91***
(0.778) (0.752)
Some college * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) -1.016 1.50**
(0.652) (0.656)
College * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) -5.74* -5.30
(3.024) (3.368)
Less than high school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 8.97*** 12.12***
(1.574) (1.525)
High school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 3.96*** 7.05***
(0.843) (0.950)
Some college * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -1.23* 3.15***
(0.679) (0.824)
College * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -5.09* -4.34
(3.052) (3.359)
Less than high school * locτc
1990 -20.55*** -19.95***
(3.751) (3.999)
High school * locτc
1990 -19.29*** -18.92***
(3.387) (3.534)
Some college * locτc
1990 -14.02*** -15.50***
(2.767) (3.024)
Less than high school * loc4τc -21.15*** -20.16***
(3.623) (4.105)
High school * loc4τc -18.90*** -18.29***
(3.017) (3.442)
Some college * loc4τc -12.95*** -15.62***
(2.260) (2.896)
Border * (Year = 2000) 0.005 0.001
(0.016) (0.017)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by conspuma, industry and year.



































Less than high school * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) -3.90 2.21
(2.956) (1.540)
High school * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) -2.19 -0.27
(2.146) (1.856)
Some college * RCAτ
j




1990 * (Year = 2000) -2.93 -1.21
(2.280) (2.345)
Less than high school * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) -4.68 4.28**
(4.133) (1.700)
High school * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) -2.14 0.67
(2.685) (2.140)
Some college * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) -1.87 1.36
(2.487) (1.906)
College * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) -3.21 -0.98
(2.803) (3.024)












Less than high school * RCA4τj 1.29 4.50
(3.290) (3.287)
High school * RCA4τj 1.94 6.61*
(3.522) (3.429)
Some college * RCA4τj -1.98 2.78
(2.982) (2.603)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by conspuma, industry and year.
** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% and 10% level.
42Table 6: Diﬀerences Between Anticipation and Impact Eﬀect
Parameter diﬀerence Point estimate F Value Pr > F
δ2,lhs − δ4,lhs -1.843 10.39 0.001
δ2,hs − δ4,hs -1.139 13.31 <0.001
δ2,scol − δ4,scol -1.646 10.79 0.001
δ2,col − δ4,col -0.957 1.23 0.27
θ2,lhs − θ4,lhs -2.066 16.46 <0.001
θ2,hs − θ4,hs -0.939 4.40 0.036
θ2,scol − θ4,scol -1.206 6.12 0.013
θ2,col − θ4,col -0.228 0.07 0.791
Table 7: Employment Growth Regression Results
Dependent Variable: Including Excluding

























Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
43Table 8: Robustness Check: Change in Mexican Import Shares





Less than high school * 4Mc * (Year = 2000) -2.05*** -0.45
(0.48) (0.48)
High school * 4Mc * (Year = 2000) -0.01 1.20***
(0.13) (0.17)
Some college * 4Mc * (Year = 2000) -0.99*** 0.23
(0.15) (0.15)
College * 4Mc * (Year = 2000) -0.36 -0.14
(0.33) (0.42)
Industry-speciﬁc controls
Less than high school * 4Mj * (Year = 2000) -1.01*** -1.07***
(0.10) (0.09)
High school * 4Mj * (Year = 2000) -0.56*** -0.60***
(0.10) (0.08)
Some college * 4Mj * (Year = 2000) -0.50*** -0.52***
(0.10) (0.10)
College * 4Mj * (Year = 2000) -0.10 -0.07
(0.20) (0.16)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by conspuma, industry and year.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
44Table 9: Robustness Check: Control for Changes in Chinese Import Share
Dependent Variable: Log Wage Excluding
Agriculture
Location-Speciﬁc Controls
Less than high school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 9.92***
(1.641)
High school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 4.82***
(0.806)
Some college * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 0.693
(0.679)
College * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) -5.90*
(3.257)
Less than high school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 11.60***
(1.548)
High school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 6.24***
(0.918)
Some college * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 2.67***
(0.861)
College * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -4.494
(3.283)
Industry-Speciﬁc Controls
Less than high school * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) 4.75***
(1.806)
High school * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) 1.328
(2.194)
Some college * RCAτ
j




1990 * (Year = 2000) -1.026
(2.430)
Less than high school * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) 6.99***
(1.978)
High school * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) 2.331
(2.432)
Some college * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) 1.722
(2.020)
College * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) -0.826
(3.069)
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by conspuma, industry and year.
*** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 10% level.
45Table 10: Robustness Check: Control for Chinese Import Share
Diﬀerences Between Anticipation and Impact Eﬀect
Parameter diﬀerence Point estimate F Value Pr > F
δ2,lhs − δ4,lhs -1.678 9.39 0.002
δ2,hs − δ4,hs -1.421 21.38 <0.001
δ2,scol − δ4,scol -1.980 24.50 <0.001
δ2,col − δ4,col -1.407 3.25 0.072
θ2,lhs − θ4,lhs -2.233 20.50 <0.001
θ2,hs − θ4,hs -1.003 4.32 0.038
θ2,scol − θ4,scol -1.091 6.22 0.013
θ2,col − θ4,col -0.200 0.05 0.819
46Table 11: Sample sensitivity: Workers in Services (excludes agriculture)
Dependent Variable: Log Wage
Location-Speciﬁc Controls
Less than high school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 21.82***
(2.12)
High school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 11.57***
(1.29)
Some college * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 4.03***
(0.59)
College * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) -4.00
(3.33)
Less than high school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 24.23***
(2.03)
High school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 12.87***
(1.56)
Some college * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 5.65***
(0.79)
College * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -2.98
(3.34)
Number of Observations 7,489,403
Diﬀerences Between Anticipation and Impact Eﬀect
Parameter diﬀerence Point estimate
δ2,lhs − δ4,lhs -2.41***
(20.11)
δ2,hs − δ4,hs -1.30***
(11.06)
δ2,scol − δ4,scol -1.62***
(13.00)
δ2,col − δ4,col -1.03
(1.49)
Standard errors or F values in parentheses.
*** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Standard errors are clustered by conspuma, industry and year.
47Table 12: Other employment outcomes (excludes agriculture)
Linear probability model Logistic model
Unemployed NILF Unemployed NILF
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Location-Speciﬁc Controls
Less than high school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 0.06 -6.71*** -1.07 -60.22***
(0.605) (1.679) (10.70) (7.54)
High school * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) -1.11*** -3.26*** -25.04*** -32.75***
(0.155) (0.981) (7.29) (5.27)
Some college * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) -0.27 -2.11*** -8.41 -29.31***
(0.171) (0.622) (10.21) (6.93)
College * locτc
1990 * (Year = 2000) 0.15 -1.56*** -7.81 -24.56***
(0.230) (0.452) (17.81) (9.30)
Less than high school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -0.44 -6.59*** -8.14 -63.58***
(0.600) (1.894) (11.58) (8.15)
High school * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -1.27*** -3.93*** -27.75*** -42.78***
(0.145) (1.069) (7.94) (5.72)
Some college * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) -0.37** -2.71*** -11.04 -39.87***
(0.184) (0.689) (11.03) (7.48)
College * loc4τc * (Year = 2000) 0.16 -1.99*** -7.13 -32.56***
(0.236) (0.502) (19.02) (10.01)
Industry-Speciﬁc Controls
Less than high school * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) -0.62 -0.34 -8.92* 2.38
(0.455) (0.425) (4.89) (3.36)
High school * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) 0.18 -0.39 -2.14 -0.95
(0.326) (0.503) (4.12) (3.05)
Some college * RCAτ
j
1990* (Year = 2000) 0.97*** -0.80** 21.20*** -13.42***
(0.353) (0.403) (6.49) (4.85)
College * RCAτ
j
1990 * (Year = 2000) 0.99*** -0.37 39.13*** -9.99
(0.263) (0.299) (10.58) (7.44)
Less than high school * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) -0.69 -0.70 -10.45* -0.65
(0.642) (0.573) (5.53) (3.91)
High school * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) 0.33 -0.86 -0.76 -7.84**
(0.437) (0.649) (4.75) (3.58)
Some college * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) 1.23*** -1.32*** 26.12*** -22.91***
(0.468) (0.505) (7.50) (5.69)
College * RCA4τj * (Year = 2000) 1.18*** -0.65 44.70*** -17.50**
(0.345) (0.412) (12.50) (8.87)
Number of Observations 9,474,678 10,320,274 9,474,678 10,320,274
Robust standard errors in parentheses. In Column 1 and 2, standard errors are clustered by
conspuma, industry and year. Column 3 and 4 report the estimated coeﬃcients from the logistic
model. ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
48